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I. INTRODUCTION
“The makers of our Constitution . . . sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.”1
Most employees would probably jump at the chance for their
employers to provide and pay for a BlackBerry.2 The pocket-sized
powerhouse keeps go-getters connected to work e-mails and the latest
news via the Internet, and the deal seems even sweeter when the boss
foots the bill. However, the circumstances surrounding this innocent little
device are more insidious than employees may realize. While providing
the opportunity to sneak out of work early and answer e-mails from the
golf course, a piece of technology like the BlackBerry has further blurred
already fuzzy lines separating the workplace from an individual’s
personal world outside the office. Despite the ostensible benefits of
employer-provided technology, such as laptops, cell phones and
BlackBerries, this blurring has serious implications for employee
expectations regarding privacy in communications sent on employerprovided technology.
A 2001 American Management Association study shed some light
on the stark reality that employers monitor workplace technology
without employee awareness.3 The study revealed that nearly 80 percent
of surveyed large employers, who retain as much as a quarter of
American workers, listened to employee phone conversations and
voicemails, and read electronic files and e-mails.4 Additionally, as of
2001, roughly 40 million American employees regularly use e-mail or
access the Internet at work5 and, as of 2004, 20.7 million American
1

Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
The BlackBerry is a wireless handheld device introduced in 1999 as a two-way
pager. In 2002, the more commonly known smartphone BlackBerry was released, which
supports push e-mail, mobile telephone, text messaging, internet, faxing, web browsing
and other wireless information services as well as a multi-touch interface. See generally
Jennifer Lane, Note, NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd.: Inventions Are Global, But
Politics Are Still Local-An Examination of the BlackBerry Case, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
59 (2006).
3
AMA, Survey: Workplace Monitoring & Surveillance, Summary of Key Findings
1 (2001).
4
Id.
5
Schulman, Andrew, The Extent of Systematic Monitory of Employee E-mail and
Internet
Use,
Privacy
Foundation
July
9,
2001,
available
at
http://diogenesllc.com/internetmonitoring.pdf.
2
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employees “telecommute” from home.6 When considered alongside a
1999 study showing that one in three workers surf the Internet for
personal reasons during work hours,7 these statistics suggest that perhaps
employees do not realize their communications on employer-provided
laptops, cell phones and BlackBerries may be monitored for their
content.8
Indeed, these statistics indicate that employees may presume the
Brandeis model of personal autonomy—the “right to be let alone”—
extends to all aspects of their lives, including communications sent on
employer-provided technology.9 While employees may have an interest
in maintaining some privacy at work, employers have conflicting
interests in monitoring technology use to learn more about how
employees utilize company time.10 Employers need to learn about the
character and personality of the employee they hire in addressing
potential and ongoing performance issues and ensuring the physical
security of their workplace.11 Thus, employers may view electronic
monitoring and other surveillance as necessary to ensure productivity,
stop leaks of confidential information, and prevent workplace
harassment.12 Moreover, employers must worry about the ever-present

6

Economic News Release: Work at Home in 2004, available at
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/homey.nr0.htm. “Telecommuting” refers to when an
“employee . . . works at home using telecommunications devices to provide a service.”
Katherine V.W. Stone, Legal Protection for Workers in Atypical Employment
Relationships in the United States, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251, 270 (2006).
7
Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002).
8
Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers’ Privacy: The United
States Law, 23 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 471, 474 (2002).
9
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See RICHARD T. DE GEORGE,
THE ETHICS OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS 102 (Blackwell Publishing,
2003).
10
See Rachel Sweeney Green, Comment, Privacy in the Government Workplace:
Employees’ Fourth Amendment and Statutory Rights to Privacy, 35 CUMB. L. REV. 639
(2005).
11
See generally Nicole Nyman, What Must Employers Do To Shield Against
Liability For Employee Wrongdoings In the Internet Age?, 1 SHIDLER J. L. COM & TECH.
7 (2005).
12
See TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 451 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002). These valid employer motives for surveillance comprise what a California
Court of Appeals referred to as the “community norms” of the American business world,
comprising an employer’s responsibility regarding legal compliance in regulated
industries, legal liability, performance review, productivity measures, and security
concerns. See also Smythe v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Jarrod J.
White, Comment, E-Mail@Work.Com: Employer Monitoring of Employee E-Mail, 48
ALA. L. REV. 1079, 1080 (1997).
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specter of litigation that hangs over the modern workplace.13 However
invasive monitoring may seem, employers have legitimate motives to
monitor employee conduct in the workplace.14
If employers monitor communications on workplace technology
and employees inadvertently divulge personal information, employees
will often struggle to find any legal protection, as the American legal
regime does not provide any generally applicable, affirmative protection
for employee privacy.15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution does provide government employees some protection in the
workplace,16 based on the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in
O’Connor v. Ortega.17 However, the protections afforded to government
employees by this framework are both limited and uncertain, in part due
to the fact that the inquiry under the test for whether privacy exists is
highly contextual. The test for whether a public-sector employee has a
workplace privacy right hinges on whether he enjoyed “reasonable
expectations” of privacy based on the circumstances of his workplace.18
Upon finding such an expectation, a court will then examine whether an
employer’s search infringed upon that expectation, which depends on
whether the search was reasonable in its inception and scope.19 As this
Comment will address, the Court’s contextual methodology has allowed
employers to alter workplace contexts with privacy policies that
extinguish any employee privacy expectations in communications sent
on workplace technology. Crucially, these doctrinal requirements for
analyzing whether an employee has a privacy expectation in his
workplace make the Fourth Amendment a poor fit for providing much

13
See, e.g., Erin M. Davis, Comment, The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior: An
Application to Employers’ Liability for the Computer or Internet Crimes Committed By
Their Employees, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH., 683, 689 (2002) (examining how the
doctrine of respondeat superior, which generally holds employers liable for the acts of
their employees, complicates the legal responsibilities an employer must consider when
providing technology to employees).
14
DE GEORGE, supra note 9, at 104.
15
See generally TIMOTHY P. GLYNN, RACHEL S. ARNOW-RICHMAN & CHARLES A.
SULLIVAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS 273–342
(2007). See also Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477
(2006).
16
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.”).
17
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
18
Id. at 714.
19
Id. at 724.
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protection on technology such as computers, cell phones, and
BlackBerries.20
Moreover, because the Fourth Amendment only applies when the
government acts, private-sector employees have no statutory federal
protection.21 While the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
(“EPPA”) protects against various kinds of electronic surveillance and
interception of communications by public and private actors, including
private-sector employers, this regime presents several potentially
insurmountable hurdles for any employee who alleges his employer
intercepted private communications on workplace technology.22 It does
not provide meaningful protection for most employees because the law
does not protect against interceptions by a service provider, who often
doubles as the employer; the protections do not apply to interception by
certain devices of communications made in the “ordinary course of
business,” and the protections do not apply when one party to the
communications consents to the interception.23
Potential state-based protections are also limited. A few state
constitutions, including California’s, provide potentially robust privacy
rights for private-sector employees.24 Moreover, some states recognize
common-law causes of action and have adopted statutory regimes that
might protect employee privacy interests in some communications.25 Yet
such protections are frequently limited and unavailable.
Both the concern and conflict about communication privacy in the
modern workplace are on dramatic display in Quon v. Arch Wireless, a
controversial case decided by a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel in June

20
See generally Symposium, Orin Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208, 1209 (2004).
21
See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (“This Court has . . .
consistently construed [the Fourth Amendment] as proscribing only governmental action;
it is wholly inapplicable ‘to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a
private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or
knowledge of any governmental official.”) (internal citation omitted).
22
18 U.S.C. § 2510-2522 (2006).
23
GLYNN, supra note 15, AT 294.
24
CA. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending . . . privacy.”). See also Hill
v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Ca. 1994) (applying California Constitution to private
employee’s claim of privacy invasion).
25
See Luedtke v. Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc., 768 P.2d 1123 (Alaska 1989) (stating
that public policy under the state constitution protects an employee’s right to withhold
private information from his employer and recognizing a cause of action for violations of
that policy); Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir. 1992) (recognizing a
cause of action for tortious “intrusion upon seclusion” in the workplace)

466

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 5:461

2008.26 In Quon, a public-sector employee, Jeff Quon, filed suit against
his employer, alleging that his employer violated his rights under the
Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution by reading his
personal text messages sent on his employer-provided pager.27 In
applying the Ortega test, the Ninth Circuit held that Quon had a
reasonable privacy expectation in his pager messages.28 The court found
that his expectation of privacy in the messages was reasonable even
though the employer provided the pager and had a formal anti-privacy
policy warning employees about the possibility of surveillance and
prohibiting the use of employer-provided technology for personal
communications.29 In spite of these warnings, the court found the
expectation was reasonable because the employer had an informal
practice of assuring Quon that he could maintain privacy in the messages
if he personally paid all monthly overage fees on the pager.30
Having located a privacy right based on Quon’s reasonable
expectations, the court also held that the employer’s review of the
content of these messages was unreasonable in scope based on its failure
to use less intrusive means in investigating whether the messages were
work-related in nature.31 The Quon court’s treatment of this issue
represents a split from several circuits and, as this Comment will
conclude, a departure from Supreme Court precedent.
In January 2009, the employer petitioned the Ninth Circuit to rehear
Quon en banc, which was denied by a majority of the Ninth Circuit
judges. The denial of the rehearing, though, inspired an impassioned
dissent, joined by seven judges and authored by Judge Ikuta, who
26

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. Quon not only sued his employer under federal and state constitutions but also
filed suit against Arch Wireless, the third-party service provider that released the content
of the text messages to the city, claiming Arch violated the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”), codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2701 and part of the EPPA. 18 U.S.C. § 2701-2711.
While this Comment focuses on the interplay between employer and employee interests
regarding workplace technology, and therefore does not confront the Ninth Circuit’s
controversial SCA interpretation, it is worth noting how the SCA presents an equally
important potential source of protection for private- and public-sector employees. The
SCA expands the scope of liability to those outside the direct employment relationship
and, as constitutional protections are often unavailable for private-sector employees, a
statute such as the SCA becomes a critically important form of protection, despite its
inherent limitations. See generally Kerr, supra note 20. It is also worth nothing that the
Ninth Circuit has already been openly criticized for its reading and application of the
SCA by a Michigan district court. See Flagg v. City of Detroit, 252 F.R.D. 346 (E.D.
Mich. 2008).
28
Quon, 529 F.3d at 908.
29
Id. at 907.
30
Id. at 908.
31
Id. at 909.
27
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directly criticized the panel’s use of the “less intrusive means” standard
that created the circuit split.32
In some regards, Quon represents valuable insight into the current
state of workplace privacy jurisprudence and could signal the potential
expansion of employee privacy. Its application also may be more
expansive than it first appears, beyond its impact on public-sector
employees in the Ninth Circuit. In addition to his Fourth Amendment
claim, Quon filed suit that his employer violated his privacy under the
California Constitution.33 Because the court held that its application of
Ortega governed its decision of Quon’s federal and state constitutional
claims, and because the California Constitution applies to private-sector
employees, the panel’s expansive inquiry into the reasonableness of the
public-sector employer’s search could have an impact on the privacy
rights of private-sector employees in California, who, as of 2005,
comprise 11.6% of the nation’s total private-sector employment.34
Part II of this Comment sets forth the dramatic facts leading up to
the Quon case, which stand as a prime example of the tension at play in
the modern workplace between employer and employee interests
regarding employer-provided communication devices. Part III discusses
the framework set forth by the Supreme Court in Ortega for investigating
claims of workplace privacy intrusion and continues with an exploration
of how the two prongs of the Ortega test have generally been applied in
the circuits. Part IV closely examines how the Ninth Circuit applied the
Ortega test in Quon, as well as the potential ramifications of the panel’s
disregard of Supreme Court precedent and the court’s split from several
sister circuits in its analysis under the second Ortega prong. Finally, this
comment concludes, in Part V, with a consideration of alternative means
to address the privacy concerns inherent in the modern workplace and a
proposal for potential legislative action to combat dwindling workplace
privacy.
II. TENSIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS ON
DISPLAY IN QUON
Before the Ninth Circuit could investigate the legal parameters of
Quon’s Fourth Amendment and state constitution claims, the trial court
32
Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 554 F.3d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 2009)
(Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc).
33
CA. CONST. art. I, § 1. (“All people are by nature free and independent and have
inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending . . . privacy.”).
34
Batelle Tech. P’ship Practice & SSTI, Laboratories of Innovation: State Bioscience
Initiatives 2004, at 5, available at http://www.bio.org/local/battelle 2004/battelle2004.pdf
(last updated July 15, 2005).
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had to confront the sordid workplace that gave rise to the dispute.35 Like
many other workplaces, the Ontario Police Department (“OPD”) had its
fair share of melodrama. While all the facts in the background of Quon’s
workplace do not bear on the crucial doctrinal aspects of the Ninth
Circuit’s decision, the gritty realities of the OPD demonstrates the
tensions at play between employer and employee interests in workplace
technology.36
Prior to the audit of Quon’s text messages at issue in the litigation,
the OPD had to address a legitimate concern: its employees had used
city-provided pagers to undermine a narcotics investigation.37 In
September 2002, one of the city’s dispatchers, Sally Bors, realized her
boyfriend, a member of the Hells Angels motorcycle gang, was under
investigation by the police department.38 Bors decided to warn her
boyfriend, Mark Timbrell, that he was being followed, but she did not
want to do the dirty work herself.39 Accordingly, she paged her friend
and fellow dispatcher Angela Santos, telling her to warn him.40 Santos
used her employer-provided pager to warn Timbrell and then quickly
confessed her malfeasance to yet another dispatcher, April Florio.41
Gossip apparently traveled like wildfire in the OPD, and Florio told
Doreen Klein, another dispatcher, about the wrongdoing.42 None of the
aforesaid participants in the incident told their supervisors about what
occurred.43 The next day, somehow aware of what had transpired,
internal affairs Sergeant Deborah Glenn spoke with Florio and Klein,
first asking them to hand over their pagers so as to prevent them from
corroborating their stories.44 Both Florio and Klein feigned ignorance
but Santos, when interviewed, confessed about the tip-off.45
When the dispatchers compromised the Hells Angels investigation
by tipping off Bors’ boyfriend, they acted in a manner that jeopardized
the city’s interests in covertly and efficiently battling crime.46 The
dispatchers’ tip-off to the Hells Angels exemplifies employee misuse of
workplace technology and demonstrates the motivations behind
employer decisions to monitor employee actions, especially when public
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 445 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1121.
Id.
Id.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149.
Id. at 1122.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1122.
Id. at 1121.
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safety may be negatively affected as a result of public-sector employees’
misconduct.47
Around the same time, Jeff Quon was about to confront his own
investigation.48 Quon, like Florio, Bors and Santos, used a city-provided
pager.49 In October 2001, the OPD purchased pagers for its SWAT team
members in order to facilitate their coordination with one another and
increase their response time in emergency situations.50 The city
contracted with Arch Wireless for a usage plan in which the city paid a
flat subscription rate for 25,000 characters per month per pager, with the
city paying any overage fees incurred by the officers on a per-character
basis.51 Upon receiving the pagers, the SWAT team members, including
Quon, were told orally that the pagers were subject to monitoring
pursuant to the city’s general anti-privacy policy.52 When hiring, the
OPD requires that all employees read and sign its formal general
Computer Usage, Internet and E-mail Policy, which informs them that all
network activity, including e-mail and Internet use, may be monitored,
with or without notice, and that the city considered as its property all
hard copy or electronic employee communications.53 Furthermore, the
city policy prohibited employee use of city property, including pagers
and cell phones, for personal or confidential communication.54 Under
this policy, the city contended at trial that it considered pager messages
sent by police officers as “e-mail,” therefore subjecting any messages
sent on city-provided alphanumeric pagers to potential auditing.55
Over the next few months, Police Chief Lloyd Scharf was
concerned that “someone was wasting a lot of City time conversing with
someone about non-related work issues” on the pagers, and asked
Lieutenant Steven Duke (“Duke”), who managed the city’s electronic
equipment, to identify those responsible for the monthly character
overages.56 Upon realizing that officers were repeatedly sending pager
messages in excess of the monthly limit, the OPD warned Quon, who
was the main offender of exceeding the monthly character limit, not to
exceed his monthly limit.57 At the same time, Duke assured Quon that
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Id. at 1124.
Id.
Id.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1123.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Quon, 529 F.3d. at 897.
Id. at 1126.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1124.
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the city would not conduct an audit of his messages as long as he paid for
the overage amount whenever he exceeded it.58 While allowing Quon to
pay for his overages, Duke claims he also reiterated several times that
messages sent from and received on the pagers were subject to the city’s
usage policy and could be audited.59 In April 2002, Quon received a
memorandum from Scharf stating: “Reminder that two-way pagers are
considered e-mail messages. This means that messages would fall under
the City’s policy as public information and eligible for auditing.”60 By
August 2002, Quon continued to exceed his monthly allotment, and
Duke had “grown tired of being a bill collector,” so the department
ordered an audit of Quon’s messages to determine the necessity of a
character-per-month increase.61
In order to carry out Scharf’s orders for an investigation, Duke
requested transcripts of the text messages from Arch Wireless, who held
the messages in storage, in order to determine whether the messages
were work-related in nature.62 Duke and Scharf read the content of
Quon’s messages sent from August 1, 2002 to September 31, 2002.63
Upon examination, the city determined that, in a month’s total of 450
text messages, Quon had sent 57 work-related messages, while the rest
were of a personal, and often sexually explicit, nature.64 The sexually
explicit text messages confirmed the water cooler gossip about Quon—
while some of the racy messages were sent to his wife, Jerilynn, a fellow
Ontario police officer, others were sent to his mistress and co-worker,
Florio.65
As Sergeant Glenn conducted her investigation into the Hells
Angels incident, she also wanted a peek at Quon’s text messages to
gauge just how inappropriate employees of the OPD were behaving,
although no evidence at trial suggested that she actually read the
messages.66 After Duke and Scharf read the messages, the city
demanded that Quon explain the sexually inappropriate messages,
warned him about potential disciplinary action, and denied him a special
assignment with the OPD.67 Quon subsequently filed suit, alleging that
the city violated Quon’s privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment and
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 1124.
Id.
Quon, 529 F.3d. at 897.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1125.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1122.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1127.
Id. at 1126.
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California Constitution by viewing the text message content.68 The other
players in this melodrama—his wife, Florio, Klein and another officer—
likewise filed suit, alleging their privacy rights had been violated due to
the OPD reading their messages to Quon, although their suits were
dismissed. 69
While the trial court ultimately dismissed Florio’s and Klein’s
claims, and the facts of their malfeasance do not bear on the doctrinal
aspects of the Quon decision,70 these facts demonstrate the tensions at
play regarding workplace technology.71 Like any savvy employer, the
OPD upgraded its technology and provided pagers to its SWAT team
members and dispatchers.72 The city also knew enough to implement a
formal technology anti-privacy policy, putting all employees on notice of
possible surveillance.73 Both of these administrative decisions exemplify
employer interests in enhancing efficiency through communicationoriented technology and maintaining some control over the technology
they provide to employees.74 The OPD had an interest in managing the
pager-use of an employee like Quon, whose consistent utilization of
employer-provided technology for personal communications revealed his
misuse of company time, for which he was earning a salary.75 While the
city may not have confronted the issue in a manner consistent with its
own best interests, its decision to find out whether an employee used
company time for his own personal communications reflects the
concerns any employer has regarding employees wasting company time
and resources.76
Conversely, the factual background of the Quon case reflects the
realities that employees will follow managerial directives and, if given
the impression that they will enjoy some sphere of privacy, they will
continue to use workplace technology for private, sensitive
communications. As demonstrated by the facts of the case, employees
cheat on their spouses, have workplace affairs, and allow their personal
problems to bleed into their professional lives—all the while potentially
divulging this sensitive information to their employers by
communicating about it on workplace computers, laptops and
BlackBerries.
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Quon, 529 F.3d. at 898.
Id.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1123.
Id.
Id. at 1125.
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d. at 1124.
Id. at 1124.
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Perhaps Quon should have known, on his own, not to send sexually
explicit messages on his employer-provided pager, especially when the
recipient was a fellow OPD employee who was not his co-worker/wife,
but the realities of his workplace conveyed a mixed message. While the
OPD had a general anti-privacy policy warning about surveillance, it also
allowed another employee with supervisory power to lead Quon to
believe he could avoid invasion into his text messages by paying his
monthly overages. Many employees in Quon’s position would likely
have felt that his direct supervisor’s actions trumped an anti-privacy
policy, which he had probably skimmed, signed two years earlier and
completely forgotten. Duke may have been trying to be a “nice guy” by
allowing Quon to pay for his overages, but this informal practice stood
contrary to all the OPD’s formal written anti-privacy policies, and
justified Quon’s belief that he enjoyed some privacy in his text messages.
These facts behind the OPD’s policies and practices send a clear warning
not only to employees, who should be aware of when their workplace
communications will be monitored, but also employers, who may have
supervisors sending contradictory and misleading messages about what
when technology will be monitored and when communications will be
kept private.
Although the Quon panel focused only on the facts regarding the
OPD’s anti-privacy policy and Quon’s use of the pager, the general
issues at the OPD embody the tension at play in the contemporary
workplace. Both employers and employees have equally important
stakes in the allocation of privacy rights regarding workplace privacy.
III. THE ORTEGA FRAMEWORK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
CIRCUITS BALANCE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE INTERESTS

After the OPD read his text messages, Quon filed suit alleging that
the city violated Quon’s Fourth Amendment rights, which protect
individuals from unwarranted searches and seizures by the government.77
In analyzing his Fourth Amendment claim, the Ninth Circuit applied the
framework set forth by the Supreme Court in O’Connor v. Ortega.78
With this seminal workplace privacy case, the Supreme Court confirmed
that the Fourth Amendment protects one’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in the workplace.79 In Ortega, the Supreme Court announced that
public-sector employees may enjoy some privacy in the physical
77
78
79

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
Id. at 716.
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workplace, such as desks and file cabinets, based on whether the context
of a particular workplace fosters within the employee a reasonable
expectation of privacy.80 The employer in Ortega, a state hospital,
searched the office of one of its doctors as part of a sexual harassment
investigation that eventually resulted in the employee’s termination.81
After his termination, Ortega claimed the search of his office violated his
Fourth Amendment rights.82 The plurality held that he enjoyed a
reasonable privacy expectation in his physical workplace, and the
government’s search was unreasonable in its inception and scope.83
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality, set forth a contextual
approach to examining whether employees have reasonable privacy
expectations and employers conducted reasonable workplace searches.84
To guide lower courts in investigating Fourth Amendment workplace
privacy claims, the plurality applied a two-part inquiry.85 First, in order
to invoke Fourth Amendment workplace privacy protection, the
employee must have enjoyed a reasonable privacy expectation in the area
or thing intruded upon at work.86 If the context of the employee’s
workplace fostered a reasonable privacy expectation, then some Fourth
Amendment protection applies, requiring the employer to, at a minimum,
provide some reasonable or legitimate reason for its intrusion into the
employee’s privacy.87
A. The First Ortega Test: Reasonable Employee Privacy Expectations
Under the first Ortega inquiry, the Court focused its analysis on the
particular context of a workplace in order to gauge the reasonableness of
an employee’s expectation of privacy.88 According to the Court, this
workplace includes “those areas and items that are related to work and
are generally within the employer’s control” and these “areas remain part
of the workplace context even if the employee has placed personal items
in them, such as a photograph placed in a desk or a letter posted on an
employee bulletin board.”89 Mere access to an employee’s items within
the workplace—for example, personal items located in an employee’s
handbag, closed luggage or a briefcase—will not extinguish a reasonable
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 716.
Id. at 712–14.
Id. at 713.
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 712–14.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 715–18.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715.
Id. at 715–16.
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privacy expectation.90 An employee’s reasonable privacy expectation and
subsequent Fourth Amendment protection hinge on the particular
workplace structures and practices affecting the workplace in question.91
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in which he suggested an
alternative test for Fourth Amendment application in the employment
context.92 Although he agreed that Ortega enjoyed a reasonable privacy
expectation in his office, he expressed dissatisfaction with the plurality’s
contextual methodology and the Court’s open invitation for employers to
regulate privacy out of existence by manipulating the context of the
workplace.93 Accordingly, he feared that “[n]o clue is provided as to how
open ‘so open’ must be” and that the plurality’s standard is “so devoid of
content that it produces rather than eliminates uncertainty in this field.”94
Justice Scalia instead proposed a categorical approach to workplace
privacy invasions, insisting that his approach would more closely align
with existing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence:
Whatever the plurality’s standard means . . . it must
be wrong if it leads to the conclusion on the present
facts that if Hospital officials had extensive workrelated reasons to enter Dr. Ortega’s office no Fourth
Amendment protection existed. It is privacy that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment, not solitude. A
man enjoys Fourth Amendment protection in his
home, for example, even though his wife and children
have the run of the place—and indeed, even though
his landlord has the right to conduct unannounced
inspections at any time. Similarly, in my view, one’s
personal office is constitutionally protected against
warrantless intrusions by the police, even though
employer and co-workers are not excluded.95

Rather than determine whether workplace privacy exists on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis, as the plurality’s test requires, Scalia would have
created a categorical approach, in which “offices of government
employees, and a fortiori the drawers and files within those offices, are
covered by Fourth Amendment protections as a general matter.”96 Under
his formulation, government employees would presumptively enjoy
privacy protection in physical workspaces, and the inquiry as to whether
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

Id. at 717.
Id.
Id. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 730–31 (Scalia, J., concurring) (internal quotes omitted).
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
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a privacy violation occurred would then turn on whether the governmentemployer’s search was reasonable.97 This categorical approach would
have ensured a more predictable or consistent privacy protection for
government employees than that afforded by the plurality’s approach,
which demonstrates a greater deference to employer interests in
monitoring the workplace.98
Scalia’s concerns seem prophetic considering how this portion of
the Ortega test has been applied by the circuits, which routinely find that
employer anti-privacy policies and other structural workplace
manipulations by employers diminish employee expectations of
privacy.99 Regardless of Scalia’s concerns and the incentives for
employers created by the plurality’s contextual methodology, a publicsector employee who alleges that his employer violated his privacy must
demonstrate that his expectation of privacy is “reasonable under all the
circumstances” of his particular workplace.100
B. The First Ortega Inquiry in the Circuits: Employer Privacy Policies
Diminish Employee Privacy Expectations
In the wake of Ortega, the circuits have applied the first Ortega
prong by examining predictable factors in a given workplace, including
an employee’s “exclusive use” of a workspace, the degree to which the
public has access to the workspace, and whether the employer
disseminated an anti-privacy policy to place employees on notice for
monitoring.101 As a result of this contextual method, employers can alter
the structure of the workplace by manipulating physical space and
furniture and through general office practices that make spaces more
open to the “public,” in order to reduce or eliminate one’s privacy
expectation. Employers often achieve this result with regard to physical
spaces and employee communications much more efficiently by simply
using anti-privacy policies so as to render privacy expectations
unreasonable.102 For example, the Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that
when employers reserve the right to monitor workplace technology in a
general policy, employees cannot have a reasonable expectation to
97

Id. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 730.
99
See infra Part III.B.
100
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 721.
101
See Am. Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 566 (6th
Cir. 1989); Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987);
United States V. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 672 (9th Cir. 1991); McGregor v. Greer, 748
F.Supp. 881, 888 (D.D.C. 1990).
102
See Heather L. Hanson, Note, The Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Are We
Really Being Reasonable?, 79 VA. L. REV. 243, 250 (1993).
98
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privacy in communications sent on workplace computers and cell
phones.103
Other circuit decisions demonstrate that anti-privacy policies can be
dispositive as to whether an employee has a reasonable expectation to
privacy. The Sixth Circuit, in American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Service, found that a postal worker had no reasonable
expectation of privacy “in light of the clearly expressed provisions
permitting random and unannounced locker inspections.”104 The court
found that the employee’s privacy expectation was unreasonable even
though the employer had never actually conducted any unannounced
locker inspection and therefore did not practice its policy.105 Moreover,
in United States v. Angevine, the Tenth Circuit found that an employee
did not have a reasonable privacy expectation in his workplace computer
when a “splash screen” warning discouraging employees from sending
personal communications appeared every time he logged in to his
computer.106 In so holding, the court reasoned that the employer’s
“computer-use policy reserved the right to randomly audit Internet use
and to monitor specific individuals suspected of misusing . . .
computers,” and the policy thereby placed the employee on notice as to
monitoring, making his expectation of privacy unreasonable.107 The
Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken a similar approach in
finding that anti-privacy policies defeat employee privacy
expectations.108

103

See Biby v. Bd. of Regents, 419 F.3d 845, 850–51 (8th Cir. 2005) (employee
cannot have reasonable expectation of privacy when employment policy warned that
employer could search employee computer for legitimate reason); United States v. Thorn,
375 F.3d 679, 683 (8th Cir. 2004) (employee denied any personal privacy right due to
public agency’s computer-use policy, which prohibited accessing sexual image and
reserved the employer’s right to access any computer in order to audit its use).
104
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 871 F.2d 556,
560 (6th Cir. 1989).
105
Id. at 560.
106
United States v. Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1133 (10th Cir. 2002). In this context, a
“splash screen” refers to a page that is displayed when an employee turns on his
computer or logs on to his e-mail system, warning that users are subject to possible
criminal penalties and that information on the computer is not confidential. The screen
may also reserve the employer’s right to inspect computers to protect business-related
concerns. See David Hricik & Chase Edward Scott, Some Limits on Evidence Gathering
in the Digital Age, 25 GP Solo, 24, 26 (2008).
107
Angevine, 281 F.3d at 1134.
108
See United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 395 (4th Cir. 2000); Muick v. Glenayre
Elecs., 280 F.3d 741, 743 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Glenayre had announced that it could inspect
the laptops that it furnished for the use of its employees, and this destroyed any
reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”); United States v. Ziegler, 456 F.3d 1138, 1142
(9th Cir. 2006), superceded by United States v. Ziegler, 474 F.3d 1184 (9th Cir. 2007).
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Conversely, the circuits have found that the absence of a general
anti-privacy policy may foster a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
workplace. In McGregor v. Greer, the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia denied the employer-defendant’s summary
judgment motion because the workplace anti-privacy policy was unclear
and the employee may have therefore had a reasonable privacy
expectation.109 The Second Circuit likewise found, in Leventhal v.
Knapek, that an employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his office computer when the employer neither practiced
routine searches on office computers nor disseminated a general antiprivacy policy.110
As demonstrated by these decisions, because an employee’s privacy
expectation must be reasonable before he has any Fourth Amendment
protection, and because the Ortega framework works on a contextual
rather than a categorical approach, private ordering has defined
workplace privacy.111 Therefore, employers may alter the context of a
given workplace to eliminate employee privacy expectations so that they
can conduct as much surveillance as desired.
C: The Second Ortega Test: Reasonable Employer Searches
Under the Ortega test, once an employee has established a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a physical or Internet space, the
inquiry turns to the second step, which is whether the employer’s
intrusion was justified. In creating this inquiry into the reasonableness of
the employer’s search, the Court carved out an exception for
government-employers conducting workplace searches, allowing
employers to circumvent historical Fourth Amendment requirements for
probable cause and a search warrant.112 The Court created an exception
to these requirements mindful of employer interests in monitoring the
workplace and the less-substantial privacy interests of government
employees compared to the privacy interests of individuals in their
homes.113 The Court stated that a public-sector employer would not have
109

McGregor v. Greer, 748 F. Supp. 881, 888 (D.D.C. 1990).
Leventhal v. Knapek, 266 F.3d 64, 74 (2d Cir. 2001). See also United States v.
Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 676–77 (5th Cir. 2002).
111
Professors Timothy Glynn, Rachel Arnow-Richman and Charles Sullivan define
“private ordering” as “the rules the parties themselves establish to govern their
relationship. Such ordering may occur by the parties’ express agreement” or “implied
from the circumstances” or even by “a ‘default rule’ establishing terms unless the parties
‘opt out’ by an agreement to the contrary.” GLYNN, supra note 15, at XXV.
112
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 737.
113
Id.
110
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to show the need for probable cause or obtain a warrant because “[t]he
delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for
probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into
tangible and often irreparable damage to the agency's work, and
ultimately to the public interest.”114
Furthermore, the Court found that placing these normal Fourth
Amendment burdens on public-sector employers would be unworkable in
practice.115 In so holding, the plurality relied on Justice Blackmun’s
concurrence in New Jersey v. T.L.O., in which he stated that a public
school teacher’s search of a student’s purse for cigarettes was reasonable
because a “special needs” exception exists for teachers to respond to
potential emergency situations.116 Under such a “special needs”
exception, a government employer is justified in not comporting with
Fourth Amendment probable cause and search warrant requirements.117
The Ortega plurality analogized public-sector employers to teachers,
who have “neither the training nor the day-to-day experience in the
complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses,
and [are] ill-equipped to make a quick judgment about the existence of
probable cause.”118
Similarly, the Court stated that “employers most frequently need to
enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related
reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct” and that “requiring an
employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose
would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be
unduly burdensome.”119 Although Blackmun dissented from the
plurality’s application of the “special needs” exception in the publicsector context,120 the plurality held that workplace searches would count
as a “special needs” exception for normal Fourth Amendment probable
cause and search warrant requirements.121
114

Id. at 724.
Id.
116
The Court recognized “limited exceptions to the probable-cause requirement where
a careful balancing of governmental and private interests suggests that the public interest
is best served by a lesser standard.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring). In articulating this “special needs” exception, Justice
Blackmun stated that, in such cases, the Court has “used such a balancing test, rather than
strictly applying the Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause, only
when we were confronted with a special law enforcement need for greater flexibility.” Id.
117
Id.
118
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 724. (quoting N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., concurring)).
119
Id. at 722.
120
Id. at 742 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
121
Id. at 722.
115
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Therefore, because workplace searches conducted by public-sector
employers would fall under the “special needs” doctrine, the standard for
determining whether an employer’s search is justified is one of
“reasonableness.”122 The Court acknowledged the interests of publicsector employers “in ensuring that their agencies operate in an effective
and efficient manner.”123 The Court further stated that “the work of these
agencies inevitably suffers from the inefficiency, incompetence,
mismanagement, or other work-related misfeasance of its employees.”124
In providing this exception, the Court did not seem greatly concerned
with employee privacy beyond whether the context of a given workplace
makes the employee’s expectation of privacy reasonable, stating that the
burden to avoid privacy violations should be on employees, who “may
avoid exposing personal belongings at work by simply leaving them at
home.”125
Then, to avoid a finding that its search violated this expectation of
privacy, the government-employer must justify its intrusion as
reasonable.126 The reasonableness of an employer’s search has two
components.127 First, the search must be reasonable at its inception, with
the employer having some “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.”128 Second, the search must be reasonable in scope, which
requires the employer to adopt measures that are “reasonably related to
the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of . . .
the nature of the [misconduct].”129 Again, this inquiry provides deference
to employers in choosing the methods they employ in conducting
workplace searches.
While the Ortega plurality merely instructed courts, in reviewing
whether an employer’s search was reasonable, to find whether a
reasonable nexus existed between the objectives of the search and the
actual search conducted, the Supreme Court later explicitly rejected
examining whether an employer could have used less intrusive means to
achieve its legitimate purposes. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’
Association, the Court analyzed a public-sector employee’s claim that his
employer’s use of drug testing violated his Fourth Amendment privacy

122
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124
125
126
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Id.
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 724.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 723.
Id. at 725.
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 726.
Id. (citing N.J. v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 (1985)).
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rights.130 In holding that the employer had a legitimate interest in
maintaining safety and efficiency and that its use of drug testing to
ensure these interests was reasonable in its inception and scope, the
Court rejected the employee’s contention that the search was
unreasonable because the government-employer could have used less
invasive means to uncover whether employees used drugs.131
The Skinner Court affirmatively stated that, under an analysis of the
second Ortega prong, it would not demand lower courts to inquire
whether there were less intrusive means available when an employer
conducts a workplace search.132 The Court reasoned that using this
standard to determine the nexus between the employer’s interest in
conducting a search and the reasonableness of the search would
undermine the Ortega plurality’s concern for respecting legitimate
employer interests:
We have repeatedly stated . . . that ‘[t]he
reasonableness of any particular government activity
does not necessarily or invariably turn on the
existence of alternative ‘less intrusive’ means. It is
obvious that ‘[t]he logic of such elaborate lessrestrictive-alternative
arguments
could
raise
insuperable barriers to the exercise of virtually all
search-and-seizure powers,’ because judges engaged
in post hoc evaluations of government conduct ‘can
almost always imagine some alternative means by
which the objectives of the [government] might have
been accomplished.’”133

Thus, the Supreme Court has clearly decided against a requirement that
employers exhaust less-invasive workplace monitoring.134

130

Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629 (1989).
Id.
132
Id. at 629, n.9.
133
Id. (internal citations omitted).
134
See also Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 663 (1995) (“We have
repeatedly refused to declare that only the ‘least intrusive’ search practicable can be
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 837
(2002) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly stated that reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment does not require employing the least intrusive means”); Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 647 (1983); Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1987); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, at 556–57 n. 12.
131
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D. The Second Ortega Prong in the Circuits: Rejection of the “Least
Intrusive Means” Test
Similar to the first prong, the circuits have followed the Supreme
Court’s framework for analyzing whether an employer’s search is
reasonable in its inception and scope. For example, the Second Circuit, in
Leventhal v. Knapek,135 applied the second prong of Ortega to hold that,
based on the fact that the employer reasonably suspected the employee
was neglecting his duties, its searches of his computer were reasonable in
light of the state’s need to investigate the allegations of the employee’s
misconduct.136 In so holding, the Second Circuit set forth the model
analysis under this prong: a court will identify the employer’s interest at
stake in the search and then determine whether the actual search
conducted is reasonable in comparison.137 If the search proves to be
excessive, it is unreasonable and the employee will succeed on his Fourth
Amendment claim.138
After the Supreme Court announced its unwillingness to analyze an
employer’s searched based on an analysis of less-intrusive means when
an employer conducted a workplace search, seven circuits likewise
rejected the “least intrusive means” test.139 However, in a case that
135

Levanthal, 266 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id.
137
Id.
138
But see Rossi v. Town of Pelham, 35 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.N.H. 1997) (local
government employee enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy to her office, and a
warrantless search by a police officer infringed upon this privacy expectation because the
search could have been conducted less intrusively by a non-officer); United States v.
Taketa, 923 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1991) (police officers did have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their office that they would not be videotaped, and probable cause was
required for such videotape surveillance).
139
See Lockhart-Bembery v. Sauro, 498 F.3d 69, 76 (1st Cir. 2007) (“To the extent
Lockhart-Bembery argues that Sauro acted unreasonably [under the Fourth Amendment]
because there were other, less intrusive ways to reduce the safety hazard, that argument
fails as a matter of law. There is no requirement that officers must select the least
intrusive means of fulfilling community caretaking responsibilities.”); Cassidy v.
Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 79 (2d Cir. 2006) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment does not require employing the least
intrusive means to accomplish the government’s ends.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Davenport v. Causey, 521 F.3d 544, 552 (6th Cir. 2008) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not require officers to use the best technique available as long as their
method is reasonable under the circumstances.”); Shell v. United States, 448 F.3d 951,
956 (7th Cir. 2006) (“As an initial matter, we note that a search does not need to be the
least intrusive alternative to be constitutionally valid, it simply has to be reasonable.”);
Shade v. City of Farmington, 309 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The Fourth
Amendment does not require officers to use the least intrusive or less intrusive means to
effectuate a search but instead permits a range of objectively reasonable conduct.”);
United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1052 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment does not require police “to use the least intrusive means in the course
136
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predates Skinner, the Ninth Circuit applied this rejected standard in its
analysis of the second Ortega prong in Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics
Corp.140 In Schowengerdt, the court held that if the employer could have
used less intrusive means to conduct the search to further its legitimate
interest, the search would be unreasonable.141 In that case, an
employee’s locked desk was searched for sexual materials, and he filed
suit alleging that the search violated his privacy expectation.142 In
remanding to the lower court to find whether the employer’s search was
reasonable at its inception and in scope, the Ninth Circuit stated that “[i]f
less intrusive methods were feasible, or if the depth of the inquiry or
extent of the seizure exceeded that necessary for the government’s
legitimate purposes, such as its interest in security, the search would be
unreasonable and Schowengerdt’s Fourth Amendment rights and right to
privacy would have been violated.”143
The Skinner Court explicitly rejected this inquiry into less-intrusive
searches as too onerous a burden on employers conducting workplace
searches.144 The Quon panel directly justified its result in finding the
OPD’s search to be unreasonable on this “less intrusive means” language
in the Schowengerdt decision.145 As discussed in the next section, this
Comment posits that by citing a pre-Skinner decision that is no longer
good law as part of its analysis under the second Ortega prong, the Quon
panel not only departed from Supreme Court precedent and split from
seven sister circuits but also upset the balance struck by the Ortega
plurality between the conflicting privacy interests of employers and
employees.
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF THE ORTEGA FRAMEWORK IN
QUON
Quon succeeded in arguing that the city violated his Fourth
Amendment rights by reading his text messages and defying his
reasonable expectation of privacy.146 In so holding, the Quon panel
correctly applied the first Ortega prong to find he had a reasonable
of a [Terry] detention, only reasonable ones”); United States v. Prevo, 435 F.3d 1343,
1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (“Suffice it to say that the Fourth Amendment does not require the
least intrusive alternative; it only requires a reasonable alternative.”).
140
Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328 (9th Cir. 1987).
141
Id. at 1336.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629, n.9.
145
Quon, 529 F.3d at 909.
146
Id. at 908.

2009]

WORKPLACE TECHNOLOGY SURVEILLANCE

483

expectation of privacy.147 However, the panel mistakenly used language
from the Schowengerdt decision and found the OPD’s search to be
unreasonable based on an analysis of less intrusive means the city could
have used when conducting the search of Quon’s text messages.148
Under its analysis of the first Ortega prong, the panel correctly
applied the contextual Ortega methodology and based its conclusion that
Quon had a reasonable expectation of privacy on the fact that the OPD
had an informal practice of allowing Quon to pay his overages, despite
the formal anti-privacy policy.149 The court found that Quon’s
expectation of privacy was reasonable due to his employer’s conflict
between a general anti-privacy policy and an informal practice of
allowing Quon to maintain his privacy in his text messages.
Therefore, regarding the panel’s analysis of the first Ortega prong,
the Quon court’s conclusion is important because it instructs employers
on how to structure and enforce workplace anti-privacy policies. This
portion of the holding stands as a lesson for employers who want to
maximize workplace surveillance by not only creating an anti-privacy
policy but strictly enforcing it in order to render unreasonable any
workplace expectation of privacy.
Regarding the analysis under the second prong, the panel applied
the rejected “less intrusive means” standard and shifted the balance
struck by the Ortega plurality.150 In finding that the OPD’s search was
unreasonable, the court adduced that it could have used several less
intrusive hypothetical means to achieve its goal of monitoring the
pagers.151 As part of its analysis, the panel quoted from its decision in
Schowengerdt, despite the fact that Skinner Court superceded the
Schowengerdt decision when it rejected the “least intrusive means”
test.152
In the wake of this controversial finding, the OPD petitioned for the
Ninth Circuit to rehear the case en banc.153 This effort split the Ninth
147
148
149
150
151
152

banc).

Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908.
Quon, 529 F.3d at 909.
Id.
Quon, 554 F.3d at 777–78 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en

153
Id. at 774. The Ninth Circuit en banc procedure has complexities that other
circuits do not. The Ninth Circuit has the distinction of being the largest circuit court in
the country, with 28 authorized judgeships. Final Report of the Commission on Structural
Alternatives for the Federal Courts of Appeals Before the S. Comm. on Courts and
Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary. 106th Cong. 220 (1999)
(prepared statement of Hon. Byron R. White, Chair, White Commission). This makes
traditional en banc petitions, which require all the judges in a circuit to rehear the case,
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Circuit: the original three-judge panel and a majority of active Ninth
Circuit judges voted to deny the petition to rehear the case, with Judge
Wardlaw writing a concurrence defending the denial, while seven judges
dissented from the denial of a rehearing, led by Judge Ikuta’s
impassioned dissent.154 In his dissent, Ikuta correctly maintained that the
panel’s analysis of whether the OPD could have used less intrusive
means to investigate employee pager use and protect its interest in
workplace efficiency runs contrary to the Ortega plurality’s concerns
with placing too great a burden on employers.155
In her concurrence to the rehearing denial, Judge Wardlaw insisted
that the panel did not employ the rejected test and instead merely ensured
the reasonableness of the nexus between the interest and the search.156
As part of this rationale, Wardlaw tried to justify the panel’s analysis of
the less-intrusive means the OPD could have used by distinguishing the
cases in which the Supreme Court rejected the “least intrusive means”
test.157 However, the test was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court
and seven sister circuits, and Wardlaw and the panel ultimately ignored
the Ortega plurality’s edict that all workplace searches by public-sector
employers fall under the “special needs” exception, and the employer,
upon conducting a search, must only demonstrate some justification for
conducting the search.158 As a result of the use of this test, the Ninth
Circuit split from sister circuits and potentially upset the Ortega balance
between employer and employee interests.159
impracticable. Due to its unruly size, the Ninth Circuit availed itself of Congress’s
modified en banc procedure, allowing any circuit with more than 15 authorized
judgeships to designate its own rule for how many judges will hear a case en banc. See 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) and Pub. L. No 95-486, § 6. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit requires that
the chief judge, along with at least 10 of the 28 judges, sit for a petition to rehear en banc,
and that this 11-judge panel will rehear the case if they unanimously agree. USCS Ct App
9th Cir., Circuit R 35–3. Regarding the OPD’s petition, because Judges Pregerson,
Wardlaw, and Leighton, comprising the original three-judge Quon panel, voted to deny
the petition to rehear the case en banc. Furthermore, when the full court was advised of
the petition for rehearing en banc, a majority of the votes of the nonrecused active judges
in favor of en banc reconsideration. Fed. R. App. P. 35. For an in-depth exploration of
how the Ninth Circuit’s size, and the resulting inefficiencies, harms “nearly 20 percent of
the nation’s population,” see Examining the Proposal to Restructure the Ninth Circuit:
Hearing on S. 1845 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 2 (2006)
(statement of Rachel L. Brand, Asst. Att’y Gen. for the Office of Legal Policy),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olp/pdf/ninth_circuit_split_aag_brand_testimony.pdf.
154
Quon, 554 F.3d at 769.
155
Id. (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc).
156
Id. (Wardlaw, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc).
157
See infra Part IV.B.
158
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 724. See also supra Part III.C. and D.
159
Quon, 529 F.3d at 777–78 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en
banc). See also supra Part III.D.
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A. Quon’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Conflict Between an
Informal Practice and a Formal Anti-Privacy Policy
Despite the city’s formal anti-privacy policy warning employees
about the possibility of surveillance, the Ninth Circuit applied the Ortega
contextual methodology to find that Quon had a reasonable expectation
of privacy based on Duke’s informal practice of allowing Quon to pay
for personal character overages to avoid an audit.160 Accordingly, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the OPD had created a reasonable privacy
expectation because it had a contrary informal practice of allowing the
officers to pay for overages to avoid audits.161
In the denial to rehear Quon en banc, Judges Wardlaw and Ikuta
agreed on the standard under the first Ortega prong but haggled over the
factual realities of the OPD and whether the informal practice actually
created a reasonable privacy expectation for Quon.162 Ikuta argued that
the mixed messages sent by the OPD should be trumped by the formal
written policy, while Wardlaw maintained that the informal practice
negated the written anti-privacy policy and gave Quon a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the content of his text messages.163 Essentially,
Wardlaw correctly stated that Quon’s expectation was reasonable
because any employee who would have been told that he could avoid an
audit of his messages if he paid the overages himself would expect his
messages to remain private if he kept paying. Therefore, this portion of
the panel’s decision is correct based on the operational realities of
Quon’s workplace.
This holding is important because it sends a message to employers
that they could potentially be held liable for workplace privacy invasions
if they allow an informal practice to foster a reasonable expectation of
privacy within employees. Therefore, Quon instructs employers on how
they can structure workplace practices and conduct surveillance without
making the OPD’s same mistake of creating and then violating employee
expectations of privacy. In order to discourage employee expectations of
privacy, employers now know that they must not only disseminate a
general anti-privacy policy but also that they must take measures to
strictly practice that policy to avoid the creation of reasonable privacy
expectations.164
160

Quon, 529 F.3d at 897.
Id.
162
Quon, 554 F.3d at 770, 774.
163
Id. at 770, 774.
164
See Mark E. Schreiber and Barbara A. Lee, Practice Tips: New Liabilities and
Policies for Incidental Private Use of Company Electronic Systems and PDAs, 52
BOSTON BAR JOURNAL 11 (2008). (“[Quon] . . . provides a sobering example of why
161

486

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 5:461

At its most extreme, the court’s holding under the first Ortega
prong provides a perverse incentive for employers to routinely intrude
into employee privacy, to ensure that no informal practices on
surveillance reverse the presumption that employees do not enjoy a
privacy expectation under general privacy policies. If an Information
Technology specialist or general manager gives employees the
impression that the company will not actually conduct surveillance, then
the employee may be found to have enjoyed a reasonable expectation of
privacy that then limits how the employer may conduct a workplace
search.165
At the same time, the holding is important for employees because
of the potential downstream effects it could have on how employers
structure workplaces. At first glance, the panel’s result—finding that an
employee enjoyed a reasonable expectation of privacy on his employerprovided pager, used under a general anti-privacy policy—seems to
provide some increased privacy protection for employees. Although the
court found that Quon had a reasonable privacy expectation, and this
seems like a victory for employees who want greater workplace privacy
protection, this decision may result in enhanced protection only in a
narrow set of cases in which an employer failed to enforce its formal
policy. Indeed, the Quon decision itself is a warning signal that this
decision provides for subsequent employers, who now know that they
must practice what they preach in terms of privacy and surveillance.166
Practically speaking, if employers really do pick up on the cues of
the Quon decision and regularly enforce their surveillance policies, the
context of a given workplace will place employees on notice that their
employers are looking over their shoulders when they communicate on
workplace computers, laptops, and cell phones. In this regard, the
decision could result in fewer mixed messages like the ones the OPD
companies should be alert to this problem so they can adjust their strategies
accordingly.”).
165
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 730.
166
See Schreiber, supra note 164 (describing Quon and setting forth explicit lessons
employers should learn from the case, including drafting “policies regarding employee
use of email, internet access, and PDAs” that are “clear that employees have no
expectation of privacy and can expect their use of these systems and devices, including
personal use and messages, to be subject to monitoring and access by the employer with
or without notice.”); CALIFORNIA EMPLOYER'S GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS AND
PERSONNEL POLICY MANUALS, 1-2 CA Guide to Employee Handbooks § 2.16 (“The
Quon decision serves as a reminder that employers must avoid statements and actions
that might be construed as giving employees a reasonable expectation of privacy in
electronic messages or other data created or transmitted using Company equipment. In
this regard, it is important that all managers in an organization stay ‘on message’ where
surveillance of employee communications is concerned.”).
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sent to its employees and will instead encourage full disclosure when
surveillance occurs. Ironically then, the contextual methodology
espoused by the Ortega plurality and underlying the Quon decision
ultimately creates an equilibrium in which employers have an incentive
to maximize surveillance to reduce employee expectations of privacy.
Accordingly, employees can trust they are being watched at all times and
are less likely to share personal correspondence on employer-provided
technology.
B. The Quon Court’s Use of the “Least Intrusive Means” Test
Pro-employee advocates in search of expanded workplace privacy
rights should instead look to the Quon panel’s analysis under the second
Ortega prong, in which the panel inquired into less-intrusive means the
OPD could have used to conduct its search. Upon finding Quon had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his text messages, the panel
investigated the reasonableness of the OPD’s search of his messages and
held that the search was unreasonable in its scope.167 As any court must
first determine when examining the reasonableness of a workplace
search, the Ninth Circuit panel identified what objective the OPD
actually had in conducting the search.168 The panel reiterated that, at the
trial level, the jury determined that the purpose of the search was to
determine the “efficacy of the existing character limits to ensure that
officers were not paying hidden work-related costs.”169 The trial court
instructed the jury that if it found this to be the purpose of the search then
they must find that the search was reasonable as a matter of law, and the
OPD was not found liable as a result. However, on appeal, the Ninth
Circuit panel determined that the “search was nevertheless
unconstitutional” because it found that the search, for Scharf’s intended
purpose, “was not reasonable in scope.”170
As part of its determination that the search conducted was
unreasonable in scope, the panel quoted Schowengerdt, stating that “if
less intrusive methods [to investigate Quon’s overages] were feasible, or
if the depth of the inquiry or extent of the seizure exceeded that
necessary for the government’s legitimate purposes . . . the search would
be unreasonable . . . .”171 Then, the Ninth Circuit inquired into the
reasonableness of the city’s investigation based not on the actual search
167

Quon, 529 F.3d at 908.
Id.
169
Quon, 445 F. Supp. 2d at 1146.
170
Quon, 529 F.3d at 908.
171
Id. (quoting Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th
Cir. 1987)).
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conducted, but rather on a litany of hypothetical less-intrusive means the
city could have used when conducting the search:
There were a host of simple ways to verify the
efficacy of the 25,000 character limit (if that, indeed,
was the intended purpose) without intruding on
[Quon’s] Fourth Amendment rights. For example, the
Department could have warned Quon that for the
month of September he was forbidden from using his
pager for personal communications, and that the
contents of all of his messages would be reviewed to
ensure the pager was used only for work-related
purposes during that time frame. Alternatively, if the
Department wanted to review past usage, it could
have asked Quon to count the characters himself, or
asked him to redact personal messages and grant
permission to the Department to review the redacted
transcript.172

Based on these alternative, potentially burdensome methods the OPD
could have utilized to discover the reason for Quon’s regular monthly
overages, the Ninth Circuit found that reading his messages “was
excessively intrusive in light of the noninvestigatory object of the
search.”173
The issue as to whether the Ninth Circuit panel actually used the
rejected “least intrusive means” test stands at the center of the
disagreement between Judge Ikuta, writing for the dissent to rehear Quon
en banc, and Judge Wardlaw, who concurred in the denial and wrote the
original panel opinion. Ikuta outright accused the panel of applying the
rejected test when it concluded that, as a matter of law, the search was
unreasonable in scope because the city could have used several less
intrusive means of investigating the efficacy of increasing the monthly
character limit.174 In Ikuta’s estimation, the use of the Schowengerdt
“less intrusive means” language, after the Supreme Court explicitly
172

Id. at 909. Like any appellate court, the Ninth Circuit Quon panel was confined to
the jury’s factual findings on the record on appeal and therefore had to assume that
Scharf’s purpose in conducting the search was to determine whether to increase the
monthly character allotment, as opposed to the alternative theory that they wanted to
determine whether Quon was misusing company time by using his pager for personal
communications. However, the panel’s analysis of the less-intrusive means the OPD
could have used, as well as it’s insinuation that the monthly character increase was not
his actual intended purpose, signals that perhaps the panel did not agree with the jury’s
finding, and the use of this rejected test allowed them a back door to ultimately finding
the search unreasonable.
173
Id.
174
Quon, 554 F.3d at 777 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc).
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rejected this standard in Skinner, places too great a burden on the
government-employer when it conducts a workplace searches.175
According to Ikuta, the Ninth Circuit’s application of the rejected test
violates the instruction set forth in Skinner and also ignores the
underlying spirit of the Ortega plurality’s concern for balancing
employee and employer interests.176
Judge Ikuta has the better argument regarding the Quon panel’s
analysis of the OPD’s search because it is rooted in Supreme Court
precedent and decisions of the majority of sister circuits. Arguing
against Ikuta, Wardlaw contended that the panel used the Schowengerdt
language because it “relate[d] to the jury's finding that Chief Scharf
conducted the search for noninvestigatory purposes.”177 Wardlaw
justified the presence of this “least intrusive means” language in the
court’s decision by stating that the panel “mentioned other ways the
[OPD] could have verified the efficacy of the 25,000-character limit
merely to illustrate our conclusion that the search was ‘excessively
intrusive’ under Ortega, when measured against the purpose of the
search as found by the jury.”178 Wardlaw also sought to defend the
panel’s use of the “least intrusive means” test by stating that the “cases in
which the Supreme Court has cautioned against employing a ‘least
intrusive means’ test have often involved circumstances in which the
government had engaged in years of investigation and study that resulted
in reasonable conclusions that the government conduct was
necessary.”179 Furthermore, Wardlaw stated that, unlike cases relied
upon by the dissent, Quon did “not involve a ‘special needs’ search,”
making, she argued, the panel’s use of the least intrusive means test
acceptable.180
Both of these arguments do not justify the panel’s use of the
rejected test. First, while some of the cases in which the Supreme Court
175
Judge Ikuta used the language of the Skinner Court to explain why “the panel’s
approach fits squarely within the Supreme Court’s explanation of why the least intrusive
means test is not appropriate: ‘[i]t is obvious that the logic of . . . elaborate lessrestrictive-alternative arguments could raise insuperable barriers to the exercise of
virtually all search-and-seizure powers, because judges engaged in post hoc evaluations
of government conduct can almost always imagine some alternative means by which the
objectives of the government might have been accomplished.’” Quon, 554 F.3d at 778
(Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc) (quoting Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. at 629 n.9).
176
Id. at 778.
177
Id. at 772.
178
Id. at 771.
179
Id. at 773 (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 629
n.9 (1989)).
180
Quon, 554 F.3d. at 773.
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explicitly rejected the test did feature “years of investigation and study,”
the Court never explicitly stated that, in cases in which no long-term
study occurs, an employer must use the least intrusive means possible
when conducting a search.181 Furthermore, Wardlaw erred in stating this
was not a “special needs” context because, as the Ortega plurality made
clear, searches conducted by public-sector employers count as “special
needs” searches that circumvent the normal Fourth Amendment
requirements for probable cause and search warrants.182 Then, despite
Wardlaw’s characterizations to the contrary, the panel utilized the
rejected test. The Quon decision therefore reflects a departure from
Supreme Court jurisprudence and the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in the other circuits.183
Underlying Ikuta’s concerns—and the central issue at the heart of
this circuit split—is the potential shift in the balance between employer
and employee interests embodied by the use of the “least intrusive
means” test. By employing this reasoning, the Ninth Circuit placed the
burden on the OPD to exhaust alternative investigations into employee
conduct before infringing on reasonable privacy expectations.184 The
Ninth Circuit’s application of the rejected test violates the instruction set
forth in Skinner and also ignores the concern underlying the Ortega
plurality’s balance of employee and employer interests. While the Ninth
Circuit was correct in its reasoning under the first Ortega prong, its
litany of “less intrusive means” undercuts the warrantless search purpose
of the Ortega decision and Justice O’Connor’s concerns that
“government offices could not function if every employment decision
became a constitutional matter.”185 While an expansion of workplace
privacy rights may be beneficial for employees, the use of a least
intrusive means test and its resulting burdens on employers could
negatively impact an employer’s ability to monitor workplace efficiency,
productivity, and safety.186
Despite the theoretical burden the Ninth Circuit has placed on
employers by utilizing the “least intrusive means” test, this split may not
181

While the factual scenarios in the background of many of the decisions in which
the Supreme Court has rejected the “least intrusive means” test do feature “years of
investigation and study,” the Court has never explicitly stated that it has rejected the use
of this burdensome standard based on the fact that general studies have been conducted.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 629. The Court did not base its rejection of the test on that, and its
subsequent decisions rejecting the “least intrusive means” test feature factual scenarios
that do not center on “years of investigation and study.” See supra Part III.C.
182
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722. See also supra Part III.C.
183
See supra Part III.
184
Green, supra note 10, at 369.
185
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
186
See Quon, 554 F.3d at 778 (Ikuta, J., dissenting from the denial to rehear en banc).
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have any lasting implications for employee privacy rights. Before
inquiring into the reasonableness of an employer’s search, a court must
always first locate a reasonable privacy interest on the part of the
employee.187 As discussed above, while the Ninth Circuit found the
employee’s expectation to be reasonable in the context of his workplace,
the decision stands as an example of a careless employer who did not
practice its anti-privacy policy, and future employers now have notice to
avoiding a similar result.188 If employers now have notice to conduct
routine surveillance and render unreasonable employee expectations of
privacy, the Quon decision suggests that employees may rarely have a
reasonable privacy expectation in the future. If employees do not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the workplace, then employers may
conduct whatever searches they want, regardless of whether they use the
least intrusive means possible. Quon, then, may ultimately represent the
limitations inherent in the current workplace privacy framework and
perhaps signals that the tension between employer and employee privacy
interests must be confronted not by judge-made law but by legislators.
V. SHOULD WORKPLACE PRIVACY BE LEFT TO PRIVATE ORDERING?
The impassioned disagreement raised by the en banc denial,
sparking debate between Judges Ikuta and Wardlaw, demonstrates that
the Ortega contextual methodology, as Justice Scalia predicted, leads to
uncertainty and confusion.189 Additionally, the Ortega test’s focus on the
context of a given workplace has provided the opportunity for
employers, who structure how an office operates, to diminish employee
privacy expectations.190 Several commentators suggest that these flaws
in the Ortega framework present insurmountable obstacles to ensuring
substantive workplace privacy protection and that judges should find
alternative means to analyze Fourth Amendment workplace privacy
violations.191
187

Ortega, 480 U.S. at 716.
Schreiber, supra note 164.
Ortega, 480 U.S. at 729–30 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190
See Hanson, supra note 102. Hanson describes the Ortega framework as
presenting two insurmountable limitations for employees. Id. at 245–46. First, the
framework, originally meant as an exception to the probable cause warrant requirement,
allows employers to conduct searches instead of police officers, who are constrained by
societal norms and formal procedural restrictions. Id. Second, Hanson sees the
requirement that, upon a finding of a privacy expectation, the government’s search be
“reasonable” as overly deferential to the government. Id.
191
Hanson suggests that courts should apply a property-based analysis to Fourth
Amendment workplace privacy claims. Under this approach, she suggests that courts
would have a “bright-line, objective definition of Fourth Amendment protection largely
beyond an employer's control” and “the property rights focus functions as a fairly good
188
189
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Ultimately, by allowing a workplace context to define the privacy
right an employee may enjoy in a society in which “[t]echnological and
communication advances mean that much of everyday life is now
recorded by someone somewhere,” the Court has perhaps diminished
Brandeis’ conception of the essential “right to be left alone.”192 Scalia’s
categorical approach may have ensured a more dependable or predictable
privacy protection for employees, but the Supreme Court has made clear
that the context of a workplace will define what an employee can expect
regarding his right to workplace privacy, and that is simply the current
state of the law.
Despite the fact that the Ortega framework allows employers to
have their cake and eat it too, perhaps the Ortega plurality had it right all
along and private ordering should rule the day, with employers dictating
the terms of a workplace context and that context defining the limits of
what privacy employees can expect to enjoy. The concept of allowing
private ordering to ultimately dictate the parameters of workplace
privacy finds a basis in what Professor Scott Sundby refers to as the true
underlying metaphor or guiding principle of the Fourth Amendment:
proxy for what the government does not legitimately need and should not be able to get,
clearly delineating what should fall outside of ‘legitimate’ internal governance concerns.”
Hanson, supra note 102, at 264. This approach, while delineating clearer distinctions
between precisely what is protected would prove problematic when applied to laptops,
cell phones and BlackBerries, which are owned by employers but used outside the office,
making them even more likely to contain personal information.
Professor Stephen Schulhofer argues that workplace searches should be allowed without
probable cause or a warrant only if pressing health and safety concerns are at issue, or if
there are “internal governance imperatives,” a standard similar to the noninvestigatory,
work-related searches allowed to ferret out misconduct by the Ortega plurality.
Schulhofer is concerned primarily with workplace drug tests, and, while his standard
would provide more rigorous protection of employee bodily integrity, the standard would
still provide great deference to government-employer interests and would therefore not
differ greatly from the Ortega approach. Stephen J. Schulhofer, On the Fourth
Amendment Rights of the Law-Abiding Public, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 87, 90–123 (1989).
In examining the general values at stake when the government seeks to obtain
information or conduct a search, Professor Christopher Slobogin has re-imagined what
privacy jurisprudence would look like without the Fourth Amendment. In its place,
Slobogin proposes a new federal scheme, developed on the basis of various state and
individual interests that inform the regulation of government searches and seizures. At
the heart of Slobogin’s theoretical proposal lies some sort of ex ante review of searches
and seizures. Pertinent to the “special needs” exception of workplace searches, Slobogin
bases his proposal of this ex ante review on an “exigency principle,” requiring the
government to obtain third party authorization from a lay decision maker prior to any
nonemergency search or seizure (the “exigency principle”). As part of the substantive
component of this hypothetical replacement scheme, Slobogin would mandate that the
level of certainty required to authorize a particular search or seizure should be roughly
proportional to the level of its intrusiveness. Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a
Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1, 11–47 (1991).
192
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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trust between the government and private citizens.193 Although the “the
notion of trust sounds, and is in many ways, so simple, so nonlegalistic,
and so nonphilosophical, that it risks being dismissed as not sufficiently
grounded in legal-political theory,” Sundby argues that this metaphor
asks the one essential question concerning government intrusions into the
individual’s sphere of privacy: “is the government’s action inconsistent
with trusting the citizenry to behave in a lawful and responsible
fashion?”194
While Sundby focuses his exploration of trust-as-metaphor on all
aspects of government intrusions and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
it finds strong echoes in the dilemma of balancing employer and
employee interests, as exemplified by the Quon decision. Sundby
focuses on the government’s need for implicit trust of the citizenry, but
this metaphor should be turned on its head in the workplace context: as
the Quon decision demonstrates, employers and employees have ample
reasons for mutual distrust, with employers suspecting employees of
laziness and wrongdoing, and employees suspecting employers invade
personal communications on workplace technology.
Perhaps Quon can teach the lesson that workplaces should be based
on mutual distrust. If employers distrust employees to some degree and
assume they require some amount of monitoring, then employees should
likewise distrust that employers deserve to know their personal
information. If employees then know that that they are being watched
due to ample notice about technology surveillance, they can accordingly
structure their behavior and refrain from divulging personal information
on workplace technology. Regardless, the Ortega framework, and its
deference to employer interests in monitoring, indicates that, despite
being watched, perhaps employees should trust employers anyway.
While employers do conduct surveillance on workplace technology, in
most cases they will not necessarily indulge in unreasonable searches, as
creating an Orwellian workplace will negatively impact employee
morale.195
If the goal is to ensure healthy workplace relationships between
employers and employees, one compromise to the problem of satisfying
both parties’ interests and expectations could center on workplace
193

Id.
Id. at 1791.
195
See David Smith, Case Note, Search and Seizure: O'Connor v. Ortega, “He Hit Me
First!,” 56 UMKC L. REV. 411, 418–19 (1988) (noting that employers would refrain
from most objectionable searches because “[a]n environment which makes an employee
feel that he or she has no privacy would be counter-productive. Therefore, it stands to
reason that employers only search an office on official business since ad hoc searches
would destroy the healthy work environment employers strive so hard to attain.”).
194
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privacy legislation requiring disclosure. Because the current state of the
law allows employers to conduct any surveillance depending on the
context of the workplace, employers should place employees on
meaningful notice when conducting workplace surveillance. As Quon’s
workplace demonstrated, sometimes a workplace context can send mixed
messages, and employers should bear the responsibility of sending a
clear, unmistakable signal that employees may be monitored and all
employees should refrain from sending private communications on
employer-provided technology. If employees are provided with such
notice, then they will at least have a meaningful choice as to whether
they will only use employer-provided technology for work-related
purposes or whether they will risk sending personal communications on
workplace laptops or BlackBerries despite the possibility of being
watched by their employers.
Fairness dictates, for example, that employers who provide laptops,
cell phones or BlackBerries should provide general and ongoing
surveillance warnings to employees in order to constantly discourage any
personal use of technology.196 This not only reserves for the employer
the right to keep track of its own technology but also puts the employee
on reasonable notice as to monitoring. Collection, use, or disclosure of
personal information should normally be done only with an employee’s
knowledge and consent, with a warning screen acknowledging
surveillance every time an employee signs on to a computer or laptop.197
Employers should give employees access to the personal information
held about them, so that they can verify and, if necessary, challenge its
accuracy and completeness.198
Employees like Quon must be provided with meaningful notice, so
they have awareness that they are being watched and will therefore keep
196
One commentator suggests that legislators should create laws that “provide clarity
on notice and consent requirements, delineate appropriate use and lifetime of data, and
afford an employee the capacity to correct false data,” Laura Evans, Monitoring
Technology in the American Workplace: Would Adopting English Privacy Standards
Better Balance Employee Privacy and Productivity?, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1115, 1144
(2007). Another commentator suggests that potential solutions include providing
meaningful remedies against the misuse or abuse of electronic surveillance by employers,
and additionally requiring employers to advise employees each time the employer
accesses their computer system, giving written notice to employees prior to instituting a
monitoring program, articulating a legitimate business reason for implementation of a
policy, or only getting information on a “need to know” basis. Michael L. Rustad &
Sandra R. Paulsson, Monitoring Employee E-Mail and Internet Usage: Avoiding the
Omniscient Electronic Sweatshop: Insights from Europe, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMPL. 829,
899–900 (2005).
197
See 10-272 Matthew Bender & Company Inc., Labor and Employment Law §
272.06. (2008).
198
Id.
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personal information private. If both players know the rules of the game,
and each can mutually distrust the other enough so that employers
routinely conduct surveillance and employees know enough to refrain
from communicating personal information on workplace technology,
then employers and employees will reach an imperfect solution to the
quandary of serving both their interests concerning workplace privacy.199
On the one hand, employers will be able to continue monitoring
employee productivity, efficiency and compliance. On the other, by
having meaningful notice not to divulge all that juicy information about
their adulterous relationships and general bad behavior on those
insidious, employer-provided BlackBerries, employees will retain a
Brandeis-quality sphere of privacy and autonomy in which their
employers cannot intrude.

199

See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 555 (1992). This proposed model, based on both sides
being on the same page, for notice regarding monitoring to prevent workplace privacy
violations has echoes of the Fourth Amendment theories of Professor William Stuntz,
who posits that the Court’s use of the “special needs” exception should be analogized to
the law of contracts, indicating that an implicit bargain between government-employers
and public-sector employees exists in the background of workplace searches. Id. at 554.
Viewing the Fourth Amendment through the lens of contract law, Stuntz believes the
“Court’s ‘special needs’ decisions have it about right” because, in the context of “special
needs” searches, the government and the citizen have a relationship independent of the
search; the government has alternative options it could pursue if a search would violate
the Fourth Amendment, such as punishment or discharge; and these searches spread
benefits to innocent search targets by ferreting out wrongdoing and streamlining
inefficiencies. Id. at 555. Basically, Stuntz believes that an implicit bargain between
citizens and the government exists in the background of any search conducted in the
“special needs” exceptions contexts of government workplaces, public schools and
regulated businesses. Id. He believes this because “rational people in the position of these
search targets would likely agree to such a regime,” as they “get something in return: a
reduced likelihood that the government will exercise other, worse alternatives.” Id. He
explains that if the government and the public-sector worker were to negotiate a rule for
workplace searches in advance, this type of negotiation “would reflect the parties’
understanding of the whole relationship, and their mutual awareness that the government
often has alternatives to searching. Id.

